MG Joseph T. Dickman.
The Dickman Board’s final report on the AEF Aviation Section is transcribed here. These papers have been reproduced as originally written, with spelling corrections and editorial additions highlighted and bracketed in blue. If you find any errors in my transcription, please do not hesitate to contact me.
American Expeditionary Forces Superior Board on Organization and Tactics
Commissioned by GEN John J. Pershing, CG AEF, on 19 April 1919.
MG Joseph T. Dickman, CG US Third Army (Chair)
MG John L. Hines, CG US III Corps
MG William Lassiter, Chief of Artillery US III Corps
BG Hugh A. Drum, CS AEF Services of Supply
BG Wilson B. Burtt, CS AEF (Attached)
COL George R. Spalding, Assistant to Chief of Engineers AEF
COL Parker Hitt, Chief Signal Officer, US Third Army
Board convened on 27 April 1919.
Board adjourned on 1 July 1919.
THE AIR SERVICE
90. Introduction. The American Air Service came into the war with only or two squadrons in being, equipped with an inferior type of Training Plane. It was necessary to build or purchase the type of planes used on the front and in addition to train and instruct the pilots for them. At the same time, the squadrons had to be organized and the mechanics and other artisans instructed in their duties. All this preliminary, required assistance of every sort from both French and British sources. Instructors were obtained and planes and accessories were purchased.
Aviation being so new, it was in a constant state of evolution. New, faster and better types of planes were being constructed. The methods of handling them, (the tactics of flying) were changing. From the original, individual plane and pilot pursuing a given mission was developed the pair and finally the flight of three to six or more planes in formation. In general a formation came to consist of five planes flying at three different levels, in a “V” shaped form, under the direction of the leader, who was at the apex of the “V.”
This development was coincident with the immense changes in the type of equipment of the plane. The armament grew from one machine gun to five; in one type, to the mounting of a small gun in addition to the machine; in the bombing types, from those carrying a few small bombs to the giant types carrying nearly a ton of explosives. The power of the motors was greatly increased so that the speed and carrying capacity of the plane constantly grew in proportion. These great changes in the short space of three or four years were such that the lessons learned in one season were hardly available in time for use in the next.
91. Development. Tactics – The Air Service developed along the following general lines:
(a) Observation, contact and artillery registration
(b) Distant reconnaissance and bombing operations
(c) Aerial combat.
(d) Combat against ground troops.
All four of these functions will continue in the future and increase in scope. However, the last is susceptible of greater development.
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The combat against ground troops did not become noticeable until 1918, and did not reach its maximum capabilities by the end of the war. This class of aerial work can be made more efficacious and decisive than the distant bombing operations and should receive the greatest attention.
In order to successfully combat this form of aerial attack, there appears to be no reason why an efficient and extensive counter-aerial Service should not be developed. Hand-in-hand with the foregoing, there must be a Security Aerial Service, i.e., a service for the protection of the ground troops from aerial attacks.
The intimate association between the ground troops and the aerial units assisting or operating with them demands that these two elements be an integral part of the same command – and as a consequence, the corps and divisions must have Air units regularly assigned to them. These units must move with them, and be considered just as much a part of the corps and division as the Infantry, Artillery and other arms.
On the other hand, the Aerial forces required for distant and strategical reconnaissance and bombing operations need have little association with the ground troops. The system of concentrating in the army troops, all protection, reconnaissance and bombing units, has not met the battle field needs and will be obsolete in future development.
Our experience then can be summarized as follows – The Air Service development, organization and utilization should be:
(1) Reconnaissance, contact, observation, and registration units to be integral elements of Division and Army Corps.
(2) Tactical combat and bombing units, and battle field security service units, to be integral parts of the Army Corps and the Army.
(3) Strategical bombing, reconnaissance and combat units, to be elements of the Army troops.
92. In General. Nothing so far brought out in the war shows that Aerial activities can be carried on, independently of ground troops, to such an extent as to materially affect the conduct of the war as a whole. It is possible, perhaps, that future wars may develop aerial forces of far greater extent than those provided in this war. It is safe to assume that Air forces will not be developed for war purposes to such an extent as to largely supplant ground and water forces, until such a proportion of the people become air-faring people
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as now are known as sea-faring people. In other words, aerial activity must bear much the same [relation] to the commercial life of the nation as at present sea-faring activities bear to public trade and commerce.
There are two factors for the present which must be considered – First, the expensiveness of the material and the provisions for its special maintenance. If it becomes possible to use in a war only Aerial forces, the matter of expense is not a paramount question. But, if on the other hand it is necessary to maintain ground and water forces for the war, then the expense of aerial forces must be considered and the Aviation provided must bear its proper relation to the other forces.
Second, the question of superior command must be considered. If a war should take place where only Aerial forces are used, question of authority between ground and air forces would not arise, because the superior Command would rest in the proper Air Commander. When, however, ground forces are to be used, and as long as present conditions prevail, we believe ground forces will continue to be the major part of those provided, the authority must be vested in the Commander of the Ground Forces, and Aviation must continue to be one of the auxiliaries of the principal arm, the Infantry. For the present, all questions of Air tactics, Air strategy and employment of Aviation must be governed by the well known and established principles of military art. Superior officers must be so thoroughly well grounded in the fundamentals of war that this important auxiliary will be always used in pursuance of the paramount object.
93. Organization. The Tables of Organization already in use appear to be, in general, based on sound lines. Slight changes should be made in order to conform to the experience we have had. The principal ones to be noted are the following:
Divisions – The command and observation squadron should be smaller than the present type and should consist of about 8 or 10 planes. There should be in addition to this squadron, permanently attached to the Division, a Balloon Company, a Photographic unit and a Branch Intelligence office.
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Army Corps – The squadron should consist of 19 planes and an organization of men and officers about as at present constituted. Combat (pursuit) and bombing squadrons should be added to the Corps Group so that the Air Force with the corps should be a complete force which will function as a unit under the most usual battle conditions.
Army – Combat, Observation and Bombing units about as at present constituted, due allowance being made for the Combat and Bombing units placed under the Army Corps.
Minor changes in the Tables of Organization and in the general administration of the Air Service are recommended by the Chief of that Service, which are concurred in by the Board.
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