Survey of Battle Casualties, Eighth Air Force,
June, July, and August 1944
Allan Palmer, M. D.
The need for information regarding causes of death in KIA (killed in action) battle casualties resulted in the organization of the Medical ORS (Operational Research Section), Professional Services Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army). Maj. Allan Palmer, MC, was appointed chief of the section on 1 June 1944.
The purpose of the Medical ORS was to investigate battle casualties from an operational point of view in order to evaluate more accurately the wounding power of various weapons and the effectiveness of protective measures. At the start, it also seemed that information would be obtained which would be of value and interest to officers, not only in the medical but also in the other services. It was postulated that the machinery for collecting data provided adequate liaison with the various branches of the Armed Forces.
Aside from occasional accidents or special incidents. . . in the United Kingdom, which were investigated by the Medical ORS, the first operational project to be dealt with was a survey of battle casualties sustained by the heavy bombardment groups of the Eighth Air Force. The survey was carried out with the cooperation of Brig. Gen. Malcolm C. Grow, USSTAF (U.S. Strategic Air Forces) surgeon, the Eighth Air Force Operational Analysis Section, the Ordnance Department, the Royal Air Force, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. A period of 3 months was taken as the time during which the day operations of the Eighth Air Force might yield a satisfactory sample of casualty data for study. The 3 months chosen were June, July, and August 1944 (D-5 to D+86). In September 1944, additional personnel were provided by the Army Air Forces, Air Technical Service Command, for a 3-month continuation of the study which was to include examination of KIA casualties from the Ninth Air Force and Troop Carrier Command.
An ideal casualty survey would provide complete information about all battle casualties and about all individuals exposed to risk, irrespective of the
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severity of injury. The points which pertain to such a survey of aircrew battle casualties follow.
1. Strength of forces engaged in operations for the survey period. -(1) Bombardment divisions and groups taking part in operations; (2) types and number of aircraft and combat personnel involved, such as "man-combat missions" carried out; and (3) hospitals serving the Eighth Air Force.
2. Losses. -(1) Aircraft and personnel about which no information could be secured because of failure to return from enemy territory; and (2) casualty data, including the causes of death and regional distribution of wounds, fractures, and amputations in the personnel killed or wounded by enemy gunfire and returned to the United Kingdom in aircraft, which could be obtained from post mortem examination of the killed, interrogation and X-ray examination of the wounded in hospital, survey of "Care of Flyer" reports and group operations at AAF (Army Air Force) stations, and identification of missiles.
3. Battle damage data pertaining to aircraft in which casualties were sustained. -This information would be of the greatest importance for the identification of the weapon causing wounds in cases where the responsible missile was not retained by the casualty. As far as protection to personnel is concerned, a knowledge of the relative frequencies of hits by enemy missiles on aircraft bearing casualties, from various directions, would enable one to place protective armor more advantageously in the aircraft or on aircrew personnel.
4. Flight formations. -The formation of heavy bombers in flight should be studied from the point of view of risk to combat crew personnel.
COLLECTION OF DATA
Strength of Forces
The 40 heavy bombardment groups of the Eighth Air Force, divided into 3 divisions, are listed in table 174.
All the groups of the 1st Division were composed of B-17 aircraft and those of the 2d Division, of B-24 aircraft. Five groups of the 3d Division (34th, 486th, 487th, 490th, and 493d) were originally composed of B-24 aircraft but were changed to B-17's on 24 August, in mid-July, on 1 August, on 18 August, and on 18 August, respectively. Thus, the 3d Division also consisted entirely of B-17 aircraft on and after 24 August. Tables 175 and 176 give a summary of Eighth Air Force heavy bomber day operations, by divisions and man-combat missions, for the 3 months' period of this survey. These data were obtained through the Office of the Surgeon, USSTAF. The total number of aircrew personnel taking part in Eighth Air Force heavy bomber day operations is given in terms of "man-combat missions," the
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average crew of a B-17 being 9 and the average crew of a B-24 being 10. Thus, a total of 69,682 sorties corresponds to a total of 657,096 man-combat missions for the 3 months' period.
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The medical installations which served the Eighth Air Force during the period, in addition to sick quarters at each AAF station, were the 1st, 7th, 65th, 91st, 97th, and 184th General Hospitals and the 49th, 121st, 136th, 231st, 280th, and 303d Station Hospitals.
Losses
Of the 69,682 sorties in which 657,096 man-combat missions were accomplished, 693 aircraft (0.99 percent) and 6,540 aircrew personnel (1.00 percent or 10.0 per 1,000) were MIA (missing in action), leaving a balance of 650,556 man-combat missions in 68,989 aircraft, from which battle casualty data were available for survey. The casualty survey study pertained specifically to battle casualties resulting from enemy gunfire, sustained by the personnel carrying out and returning from a total of 650,556 man-combat missions.
A few incidental facts were collected in relation to the 6,540 aircrew personnel MIA during the 3 months. Followup records at Eighth Air Force headquarters showed that, for the first 8 months of 1944, 2 out of 5 (40 percent) MIA personnel were possibly KIA and 3 out of 5 (60 percent) were known to be WIA (wounded in action), prisoners of war, or evaders.
By arrangements through official channels, all KIA aircrew battle casualties returning to the United Kingdom in heavy bombers, as well as all those dying in hospital within 24 hours of entry or before surgical treatment, were brought for examination to the Medical ORS laboratory, located on the grounds of the
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Cambridge American Military Cemetery (fig. 274). Examinations for the missile and injuries caused by the missile were made. No search was made in any part of the body where it was obvious a missile had not penetrated. The Graves Registration Service of the Quartermaster Corps at the Cambridge American Military Cemetery was very cooperative in notifying the Medical ORS when aircrew battle casualties were received for burial, so that the bodies could be brought immediately to the laboratory for examination.
Questionnaire forms, requesting such data as the circumstances of death, combat crew position, and altitude, were completed and forwarded by the group surgeons of the AAF stations from which the KIA casualties came. Of the 110 KIA casualties for the 3 months' period, 89 (81 percent) were examined at the Medical ORS. Of the 21 not examined, 7 were casualties who died in a hospital 1 to 6 days after being wounded.
Daily admission and disposition reports were received from the 12 hospitals serving the Eighth Air Force. From these, the entries of aircrew battle casualties were noted. There were 1,007 WIA battle casualties for the 3 months' period. Since ORS consisted of only one medical officer and one enlisted man during the first 2 months of the survey, it was impossible to visit and interrogate all battle casualties in hospitals before they were discharged. However, during the third month of the survey, interrogations were accomplished with the aid of additional enlisted men, and a total of 434 (43 percent) of the WIA were seen. X-ray records of the majority of the remaining WIA casualties were examined for missile size, number, and location, and for fractures. The hospital admission and disposition reports further served the purpose of determining the time spent in hospitals by WIA casualties and their redisposition to duty, to the Zone of Interior, or to a Detachment of Patients.
Further checking of the completeness of the casualty survey was accomplished by a medical officer of ORS visiting each of the 40 heavy bomber stations. The purpose of these visits was to verify the battle casualty status of aircrew members from a perusal of "Care of Flyer" reports of those patients missed in hospitals and to obtain information on battle casualties whose injuries were so slight as not to require hospitalization. The Care of Flyer reports also provided more accurate information on the final disposition of WIA casualties and on the time lost from flying status.
Missiles were identified from British and U.S. ordnance publications and when necessary by consultation with a member of the Ordnance Office, USSTAF. Photographic records of missiles were made periodically by a photographer supplied by the Army Pictorial Service. It was not possible to have photographic equipment issued to the Medical ORS for making photographic rec-
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ords of fatal wounds. The only such records available were those photographs taken at the AAF stations for the USSTAF surgeon's "Body Armor Reports." These photographs were borrowed and photostatic copies of them obtained. A 39-percent photographic coverage of KIA casualties from the 1st and 2d Divisions was achieved in this way. No photographs were available of casualties sustained by the 3d Division.
Aircraft Battle Damage
Group and squadron operations offices at each of the heavy bomber stations provided the identification number of each aircraft in which a KIA or a WIA battle casualty occurred, so that a report on the damage to the plane might be secured.
Permission was obtained from the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, for the Medical ORS to borrow, for photostatic copying, the battle damage reports of heavy bomber aircraft in which casualties had occurred. These reports were prepared by the AAF station engineers on most damaged B-17 and B-24 aircraft and were forwarded to the Operational Research Section of the Eighth Air Force. The serial numbers of aircraft in which casualties occurred were obtained from every AAF station operations office and submitted to the Eighth Air Force Operational Research Section. Since only one copy of these battle damage reports was prepared, it was necessary to obtain, deliver for photostating, and return personally the reports at regular intervals. Battle damage reports pertaining to a total of 656 aircraft, in which there were 771 casualties, were obtained. This represents a 70-percent coverage of aircraft battle damage data associated with 70 percent of the casualties in the survey. Tables 177, 178, 179, and 180 give the number and types of the aircraft examined in this way by divisions, the cause of the damage, and the number of casualties per aircraft.
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Flight Formations
The flight formations of heavy bombers over enemy territory on missions, during which there were battle casualties, were studied. Diagrammatic flight formations were obtained from the Operations Office, Operational Research Section, Eighth Air Force. A total of 288 complete group flight formation plans of Eighth Air Force heavy bombers was available. These formations were selected on the basis that in each one there was at least one
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casualty in one aircraft. Thus, the relationship between casualties and flight formations for 539 battle casualties (48 percent of the total sample) was observed.
ANALYSIS OF BATTLE CASUALTIES
General
During the 3 months in which this survey of battle casualties returning to the United Kingdom was conducted, there were 1,117 battle casualties of whom 110 were killed and 1,007 wounded by enemy fire. Table 181 shows their distribution between the heavy bombardment groups. This represents a casualty rate of 0.172 percent (1.72 per 1,000) in terms of man-combat missions about which casualty data were available and 0.170 percent (1.70 per 1,000) of all man-combat missions. The ratio of MIA personnel to known battle casualties is approximately 6 to 1 (5.85 percent).
These figures may be compared with those given by the Surgeon, USSTAF, in his "Annual Report of Health" for 1943-44. For 1 year ending with the first month of the present survey, the battle casualty rate for the Eighth Air Force is reported as 0.201 percent (2.01 per 1,000) of man-combat missions credited. The MIA rate for the same period was 1.95 percent (19.5 per 1,000). The ratio of MIA personnel to known battle casualties was 9.7 percent or
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nearly 10 to 1. Thus, the casualty rate and MIA rate for the 3 months which are the subject of this report are, respectively, 15.4 and 48.7 percent less than the corresponding figures for 1943-44.
In the present survey, the 1,117 battle casualties occurred in a total of 944 aircraft. Table 182 gives their frequency and distribution in the two types of heavy bombers. Approximately 72 percent of the casualties occurred with a distribution of one per aircraft. Multiple casualties per aircraft in the two types of heavy bombers did not differ significantly in their occurrence.
From the data in tables 176 and 182, it can be seen that the aircrew battle casualty rate is 2.10 per 1,000 man-combat missions in B-17's and 1.26 per 1,000 in B-24's. Thus, the risk of becoming a battle casualty was approximately two-thirds (67 percent) greater to B-17 personnel than it was to B-24 aircrew personnel. Since this conclusion is derived from an analysis of only those casualties who were brought back to the United Kingdom, it cannot be assumed that the real risk rates in the two types of bombers are as represented by the cited figures. If, for example, there was a higher casualty rate in missing B-24 personnel than in missing B-17 personnel, the figures could change significantly. However, with the available information, one must take account of the apparent difference which is very clearly significant. The reasons or causes for the difference merit further investigation. A fuller analysis of flak hits on aircraft in which casualties occurred appears in another chapter (p. 620).